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UNCITRAL’s Unclear Transparency 
Instrument: Fashioning the Form and 
Application of a Legal Standard 
Ensuring Greater Disclosure in 
Investor-State Arbitrations 
By Julie Lee 
Abstract: Confidentiality in commercial arbitrations—a main feature of 
international arbitration—is highly coveted by companies that safeguard their 
reputation and proprietary information.  However, secrecy may not be so 
sacrosanct to investor-State arbitrations involving economic disputes between 
sovereign States and private actors.  Recognizing the different demands for 
transparency in purely private versus investor-State arbitrations, the United 
Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) tasked a 
Working Group with drafting new transparency standards for incorporation into 
the existing set of UNCITRAL Rules.  In addition to evaluating the merits of the 
desirability for increased disclosure in the arbitral process, this Comment 
focuses on the importance of the form in which these standards are drafted as 
well as the complexities surrounding the application of the standards to existing 
and future treaties. For over two years, the forms and applications of 
transparency standards were debated amidst a flurry of policy considerations.  
Rather than probing the content of the proposal that recently emerged from this 
debate, this Comment focuses on the policy considerations that went into 
drafting the new standards. This Comment further advocates for a form and 
application of the standards that best achieve the Commission’s objective in 
promoting greater transparency in investor-State arbitrations.  Under such a 
rubric, party consent and autonomy should still be preserved and the application 
of new transparency standards should remain consistent with the approaches 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
At its forty-eighth session held in New York during February of 2008, 
the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL 
or the Commission) discussed the possibility of creating rules on 
transparency for investment arbitrations
1
 as part of the revisions to the 
UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules (2010 UNCITRAL Rules).
2
  However, the 
task of crafting and incorporating transparency provisions as part of the 
2010 UNCITRAL Rules was eventually shelved for future consideration; 
the Commission maintained that the scope of the 2010 revisions would be 
 
 1  The terms “investment arbitration” and “investor-State arbitration” are used 
interchangeably throughout this Comment. 
 2  See U.N. Comm’n on Int’l Trade Law Rep. of the Working Group on Arbitration and 
Conciliation on the work of its 48th Sess., New York, U.S., Feb. 4–8, 2008, ¶ 57, U.N. Doc. 
A/CN.9/646 (Feb. 29, 2008) [hereinafter Report of the Working Group Forty-Eighth 
Session]. 
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limited to updating and modernizing the 1976 UNCITAL Rules.
3
  Any 
wholesale revisions or complex modifications to the Rules, such as 
designing transparency standards, would be revisited upon completion of 
the 2010 changes.  Accordingly, after the completion of the 2010 
UNCITRAL Rules, delegates returned their attention to introducing 
transparency standards to investment arbitrations.
4
 
The development of the UNCITRAL Rules is a success story in itself. 
Since their adoption in 1976, they have been hailed as “one of the most 
widely recognized sets of rules for the settlement of disputes arising in the 
context of international commerce.”5  Since its inception, UNCITRAL has 
facilitated ad hoc arbitrations to parties that prefer a method of dispute 
resolution different from litigation.
6
  There are many advantages to 
arbitration over litigation.  For example, parties to arbitration may enjoy the 
benefits of a more expedited and cost-efficient dispute resolution process 
administered by a neutral tribunal than they would through litigation under 
a foreign jurisdiction.  Additionally, one of the most valued features of 
international arbitration is the imposition of confidentiality restrictions over 
the arbitration process, which allows parties to resolve their disputes outside 
of the public arena.
7
  This cloak of confidentiality has afforded a wide 
swath of protection to commercial arbitrations—foregoing open hearings, 
third-party participation, and public disclosure of documents, awards, and 
damages. 
Today, over thirty years have passed since the genesis of the 1976 
UNCITRAL Rules.  As the Commission seeks to incorporate transparency 
 
 3  See U.N. Comm’n on Int’l Trade Law Rep. of the Working Group II (Arbitration and 
Conciliation) on the work of its 54th Sess., New York, U.S., Feb. 7–11, 2011, ¶ 4, U.N. Doc. 
A/CN.9/717 (Feb. 25, 2011) [hereinafter Report of the Working Group Fifty-Fourth 
Session]. 
 4  See id. 
 5  Markus Wirth, The Current Revision of the UNCITRAL Rules, in NEW DEVELOPMENTS 
IN INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 1 (Christoph Müller & Antonio Rigozzi eds., 
2008), available at http://www.homburger.ch/fileadmin/publications/UONO26O_01.pdf. 
 6  Ad hoc arbitration is a proceeding that is not administered by an arbitral institution and 
requires parties to make their own arrangements for the selection of arbitrators and for the 
designation of rules, applicable law, procedures, and administrative support.  See generally 
PUBLISHER’S EDITORIAL STAFF, CORPORATE COUNSEL’S GUIDE TO ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE 
RESOLUTION TECHNIQUES § 3:42 (2012). 
 7  Confidentiality is widely perceived to be a principle advantage to private arbitration as 
compared with litigation.  There is commonly an expectation that arbitration will take place 
in privacy with limited disclosure of documents, hearings, and awards to the general public.  
See Geoff Nicholas & Briana Young, Global Overview, in ARBITRATION WORLD: 
JURISDICTIONAL COMPARISONS xi, xxvi (J. William Rowley ed., 2d ed. 2006).  However, 
where there is an absence of an explicit agreement on what should be held confidential, there 
is little uniformity among arbitral institutions over which aspects of arbitration are subject to 
public scrutiny.  Id. 
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standards to the UNCITRAL Rules for the first time in its history, 
commentators remark that “the [original] drafters of the Rules could not 
possibly have anticipated all of the difficulties that have emerged in the 
international arbitral process.”8  Nevertheless, in the complex, modern 
world that has arisen over thirty years of rapid globalization, the 
Commission must and does recognize the importance and desirability of 
enhancing transparency in investor-State arbitrations. 
When considering transparency standards, investor-State arbitrations 
should be distinguished from purely private or commercial arbitrations.  In 
investor-State arbitrations, States are parties to the dispute, and government 
activities may be subject to basic requirements of transparency and public 
participation.
9
  Claims against the State are usually based on international 
legal obligations found in treaties, “such as the obligation not to expropriate 
except for a public purpose, without discrimination, and on payment of 
prompt, adequate, and effective compensation.”10  Provisions geared 
towards increased transparency could enhance the public understanding of 
the arbitration process and its overall credibility.  Thus, while companies 
that safeguard their reputation and proprietary information covet 
confidentiality in commercial arbitrations, secrecy in investor-State 
arbitrations may not be as sacrosanct to sovereign government parties 
involved in treaty disputes. 
The incorporation of transparency provisions is more easily proposed 
than achieved.  The 1976 UNCITRAL Rules were designed and enacted 
with the purpose of facilitating the expeditious and effective settlement of 
commercial disputes.
11
  The UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules were not 
initially designed as a public mechanism for settling disputes since 
investment arbitration was far less common in the 1970s than today.
12
  
However, even today the vast majority of arbitrations facilitated by the 
UNCITRAL Rules remain commercial in nature.  Therefore, UNCITRAL’s 
challenge is to strike the proper balance of incorporating transparency 
standards (unanticipated by the original drafters) that will not drastically 
 
  8  JAN PAULSSON & GEORGIOS PETROCHILOS, REVISION OF THE UNCITRAL ARBITRATION 
RULES 2 (2006), available at http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/news/arbrules_report.pdf. 
 9  Investor-State arbitrations provide foreign investors rights to seek redress for damages 
arising out of alleged breaches of investment-related obligations by host governments.  
Investor-State arbitrations have grown in popularity over the past two decades because of the 
procedure’s advantages: investor disputes are resolved by mechanisms and institutions 
governed by international standards, rather than the inherently conflicting jurisdictions of 
domestic, host States.  See generally Andrea K. Bjorklund, The Emerging Civilization of 
Investment Arbitration, 113 PENN ST. L. REV. 1269, 1270 (2009). 
 10  Id. 
 11  See Jonathan Sutcliffe & Anibal Sabater, UNCITRAL Arbitration: New Rules on 
Transparency?, 23 MEALEY’S INT’L ARB. REP., May 2008, at 32, 33. 
 12  Id. 
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alter the original structure, spirit, or drafting style of the text.
13
 
An assembly of delegates that comprise the Working Group II recently 
reached a long-awaited consensus on a draft proposal of the new 
transparency standards.
14
  This Comment does not probe into the content of 
the new transparency standards themselves.  Rather, this Comment focuses 
on the challenges surrounding the form and application of the new 
standards.  The task of designing and incorporating transparency standards 
is not merely a rote technical exercise; it entails a careful deliberation and 
sifting of weighty policy considerations. 
This Comment contends that in order to promote and legitimize greater 
public disclosure and access to investor-State disputes, UNCITRAL 
transparency standards should take the form of binding rules applicable to 
(a) existing treaties by express consent and (b) future treaties by default.  
These recommendations aim to recognize party autonomy and the principle 
of contractual respect in the pursuit for greater transparency. 
This Comment first examines the rise in popularity of investor-State 
arbitrations and the increasing use of UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules in Part 
II.  Next, Part III explores the case for transparency and then discusses the 
merits of greater disclosure in investment arbitrations.  In Part IV, this 
Comment takes lesson from the developments of transparency rules and 
guidelines issued by the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) 
and the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID).  
Part V introduces the Working Group that was tasked with drafting the 
transparency standards.  More importantly, Part V advocates for the form in 
which UNCITRAL transparency provisions should be drafted and argues 
that the standards should apply differently to existing and future treaties.  
Part VI concludes this Comment. 
 
 
 13  See Rep. of the U.N. Comm’n on Int’l Trade Law, 43rd Sess., June 21–July 9, 2010, 
U.N. Doc. A/65/17, annex I; GAOR, 65th Sess., Supp. No. 17 (2010) [hereinafter 2010 
UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules], 
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/arbitration/2010Arbitration_rules.html 
(last visited Mar. 5, 2013). 
 14  At the Working Group II meetings in October of 2012, “some issues were settled, 
[while] many very significant ones remain[ed] contentious . . . .”  Lise Johnson, Inching 
Towards Consensus: An Update on the UNCITRAL Transparency Negotiations, INVESTMENT 
TREATY NEWS (Oct. 30, 2012), http://www.iisd.org/itn/2012/10/30/inching-towards-
consensus-an-update-on-the-uncitral-transparency-negotiations/.  The Working Group II 
reconvened in February 2013, at which time they finally reached a consensus on a draft 
version of the transparency standards, which “must still be subjected to a ‘legal scrub’ and 
then approved by the UNCITRAL Commission at its next meeting in July in Vienna.”  Luke 
Eric Peterson, UN Working Group Finalizes UNCITRAL Transparency Rules, but They 
Won’t Apply Automatically to Stockpiles of Existing Investment Treaties, INVESTMENT ARB. 
REP. (Feb. 14, 2013), http://www.iareporter.com/articles/20130215_4. 
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II. BACKGROUND AND OVERVIEW OF INVESTOR-STATE 
ARBITRATION 
The popularity of international arbitration continues to grow.  
According to the 2010 International Arbitration Survey, international 
arbitration is the dispute resolution mechanism of choice for many 
corporations.
15
  Private investors have demonstrated an increased 
willingness to rely on international investment agreements to resolve 
transnational disputes.
16
  Likewise, international arbitration is a popular 
form of investment dispute resolution and protection between a State and 
foreign investors.  Investment-treaty or State arbitrations, in which States 
are held accountable by private foreign investors for alleged breaches of 
their international obligations, have multiplied over the past decades with 
the growth of bilateral and multilateral trade and investment treaties.
17
  
States have resorted to investment treaties to ensure that among the parties 
to an agreement or negotiation, there would be definitive rules relating to 
foreign investment.
18
  The dramatic growth of investment arbitration is 
“largely the result of the proliferation of bilateral investment treaties 
(BITs),
19
 and free trade agreements
20
 at the bilateral, regional, and 
interregional levels, which allow private investors to resort to arbitration to 
protect their commercial interests against measures adopted by States in 
their sovereign capacity.”21 
Direct arbitration between the host State and the foreign investor is the 
preferred option for the settlement of investment disputes.
22
  International 
 
 15  See generally PAUL FRIEDLAND & LOUKAS MISTRELIS, WHITE & CASE LLP, 2010 
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION SURVEY: CHOICES IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 1, 6 
(2011), available at 
http://www.arbitrationonline.org/docs/2010_InternationalArbitrationSurveyReport.pdf. 
 16  Andrew P. Tuck, Investor-State Arbitration Revised: A Critical Analysis of the 
Revisions and Proposed Reforms to the ICSID and UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, 13 L. & 
BUS. REV. AM. 885, 886 (2007). 
 17  Judith Levine, Current Trends in International Arbitral Practice as Reflected in the 
Revision of the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, 31 U.N.S.W. L.J. 266, 278 (2008). 
 18  M. SORNARAJAH, INTERNATIONAL LAW OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT 233 (1994). 
 19  BITs are “agreements between two countries for the reciprocal encouragement, 
promotion and protection of investments in each other’s territories by companies based in 
either country.”  What are BITs?, UNITED NATIONS CONF. ON TRADE DEV., 
http://www.unctadxi.org/templates/Page____1006.aspx (last updated Aug. 17, 2004). 
 20  A free trade agreement is an agreement between two or more countries to establish a 
free trade area where commerce in goods and services can be conducted across their 
common borders without tariffs or hindrances, but capital or labor may not move freely.  See 
Free Trade Agreements, INT’L TRADE ADMIN., http://trade.gov/fta/ (last visited Mar. 10, 
2013). 
 21  Tuck, supra note 16, at 885–86. 
 22  Surridge & Beecheno, Arbitration/ADR Versus Litigation, HG.ORG (Sept. 4, 2006), 
http://www.hg.org/articles/article_1530.html. 
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arbitration provides an attractive alternative to the settlement of investment 
disputes by national courts or through diplomatic protection.
23
  Investors 
rarely view the settlement of a dispute through a host State’s court as 
sufficiently impartial.
24
  Additionally, regular courts may in fact lack the 
neutrality required to resolve complex international investment disputes.
25
  
Diplomatic protections, moreover, are discretionary, meaning the investor 
has no right to them.  Therefore, it is not surprising that investment disputes 
are commonly settled through international arbitration. 
Most investor-State arbitrations are conducted under the ICSID Rules, 
the ICSID Additional Facility Arbitration Rules, or the UNCITRAL 
Arbitration Rules.
26
  The second most common type of investor-State 
arbitration after the institutional form of arbitration is the ad hoc form 
pursuant to the UNCITRAL Rules.
27
  The UNCITRAL Rules are the most 
popular rules for ad hoc arbitrations.
28
  Of the over 219 known investor-




III. THE CASE FOR GREATER TRANSPARENCY 
The rise of investor-State arbitrations under the UNCITRAL Rules 
 
 23  See Steven P. Finizio et al., Recent Developments in Investor-State Arbitration: 
Effective Use of Provisional Measures, in EUROPEAN ARBITRATION REVIEW: GLOBAL 




 24  Id. 
 25  Id. (noting that international investment agreements are designed to guarantee legal 
protections “above and beyond that provided by the host state’s laws.  Equally important, 
they usually provide for [an arbitration system that includes] a neutral forum for resolving 
disputes with local government entities, which allows foreign investors to avoid the local 
courts when such disputes arise—a particularly valuable benefit in countries with unreliable, 
inefficient (or even corrupt) judicial systems.”). 
 26  More than sixty percent of investor-State arbitrations are brought under the ICSID 
Convention and proceed under the ICSID Arbitration Rules or the ICSID Additional Facility 
Rules United Nations Conference on Trade and Development.  Gary B. Born & Ethan G. 
Shenkman, Confidentiality and Transparency in Commercial and Investor-State 
International Arbitration, in THE FUTURE OF INVESTMENT ARBITRATION 5, 28 (Catherine A. 
Rogers & Roger P. Alfred eds., 2009); see also U. N. Conference on Trade & Dev., Latest 
Developments in Investor-State Dispute Settlement, [2008] IIA Monitor, No. 1, at 1–2, U.N. 
Doc. UNCTAD/WEB/ITE/IIA/2008/3. 
 27  See U.N. Conf. on Trade & Dev., supra note 26;  see generally supra note 6 (defining 
what an ad hoc arbitration consists of). 
 28  See A Comparison Between the ICC Arbitration Rules and the UNCITRAL Arbitration 
Rules, ALWAYS ASSOCIATES (Feb. 2005), http://www.alway-associates.co.uk/legal-
update/article.asp?id=72. 
 29  Tuck, supra note 16, at 886. 
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raises issues regarding public disclosure and accessibility.  Arbitrations 
involving a State are markedly different from commercial arbitrations 
involving only private parties, because the latter do not implicate public 
interest concerns in ways that the former do.  Purely commercial arbitration, 
agreed upon between private parties without registration or publication of 
final decisions, “does not offend fundamental principles of justice, nor does 
it as such involve questions of democratic legitimacy” so long as the 
dispute does not pertain to matters of public policy.
30
  In general, arbitration 
is a private process, and confidentiality is widely perceived to be one of the 
key advantages to arbitration.
31
  Commercial arbitration exercises higher 
degrees of confidentiality and privacy through means of closed doors and 
unpublished awards rather than judicial proceedings before courts of law.
32
  
Regulatory measures taken because of legitimate government concerns in 
investor-State arbitrations, on the other hand, demand more accountability 
and greater scrutiny by the public.
33
  “Arbitrations brought by foreign 
investors against governments under the auspices of bilateral and 
multilateral investment treaties”34 give rise to special issues of public 
interest: 
[T]he very presence of a State as a party to the arbitration raises a 
public interest because the nationals and residents of that State have 
an interest in how government acts during the arbitration and in the 
outcome of the arbitration. Moreover, the existence of this public 
interest has obvious implications for the conduct of the arbitration: 
according to principles of human rights law and good governance, 
government activities should be subject to basic requirements of 
transparency and public participation.
35
 
The case for increased transparency and third party participation 
mostly centers on “the more prominent notions of democratic legitimacy” 
of good governance.
36
  Investor-State arbitration has the potential to 
 
 30  Carl-Sebastian Zoellner, Third-Party Participation (NGO’s and Private Persons) and 
Transparency in ICSID Proceedings, in THE INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION ON THE 
SETTLEMENT OF INVESTMENT DISPUTES (ICSID): TAKING STOCK AFTER 40 YEARS 179, 180 
(Rainer Hofmann & Christian J. Tams eds., 2007); see generally Nigel Blackaby, Public 
Interest and Investment Treaty Arbitration, 1 TRANSNAT’L DISP. MGMT. 355 (2004). 
 31  See Nicholas & Young, supra note 7, at xii. 
 32  See Report of the Working Group Fifty-Fourth Session, supra note 3, ¶ 14. 
 33  Levine, supra note 17, at 279. 
 34  Id. 
 35  CTR. FOR INT’L ENVTL. LAW & INT’L INST. FOR SUSTAINABLE DEV., REVISING THE 
UNCITRAL ARBITRATION RULES TO ADDRESS INVESTOR-STATE ARBITRATIONS 4 (rev. ed. 
2007), available at 
http://www.ciel.org/Publications/CIEL_IISD_RevisingUNCITRAL_Dec07.pdf. 
 36  Zoellner, supra note 30, at 200. 
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significantly affect the public interest, not merely because a State may be a 
party to the dispute, but mainly because many of the issues at stake impact 
the provision and costs of public goods and services.
37
  Some examples of 
recent investment arbitration cases implicating public interests include: 
water supply systems in South America, regulation of hazardous waste by 
Canada and Mexico, fiscal responses by Argentina, and positive racial 
discrimination laws in South America.
38
  These cases are brought in 
increasing numbers under the UNCITRAL Rules on an ad hoc basis, but the 
Rules are silent as to the issue of transparency.
39
 
The issue of transparency has risen to prominence in the international 
arbitration community in recent years.
40
  For example, there has been a 
movement towards wider publication of awards over the last twenty years.
41
  
This movement has been undertaken “in the interests of establishing a body 
of decisions that may be a useful reference for arbitrators” and thus has 
been instrumental in building a body of case law.
42
 
Another motivation for promulgating rules for better transparency is 
the benefit of allowing third party participation in the arbitration process.  
Third party amicus submissions enhance the availability of knowledge and 
information pertaining to a certain dispute.  Non-disputing parties may file 
amicus curiae briefs to enlighten the tribunal about important aspects of a 
case that have been omitted from the parties’ own submissions.43  The 
parties to the dispute may overlook supplemental concerns, fail to provide 
key information either due to a lack of expertise on a subject,
44
 or lack a 
personal stake in the outcome of certain public matters.
45
  It is a truism that 
 
 37  See id. 
 38  See generally CTR. FOR INT’L ENVTL. LAW & INT’L INST. FOR SUSTAINABLE DEV., 
supra note 35. 
 39  Wirth, supra note 5, at 16. 
 40  See generally infra Part V. 
 41  An example of published awards may be found at Search Online Decisions and 
Awards, INT’L CENTER FOR SETTLEMENT INVESTMENT DISPUTES, 
https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&reqFrom=Main&ac
tionVal=OnlineAward (last visited Jan. 3, 2013).  Certain investor-State awards can also be 
found at New Awards, Decisions and Materials, INVESTMENT TREATY ARB., 
http://ita.law.uvic.ca (last visited Jan. 3, 2013), and certain awards under the UNCITRAL 
Arbitration Rules are available at Case Law on UNCITRAL Texts (CLOUT), UNITED 
NATIONS COMMISSION ON INT’L TRADE L., www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/case_law.html (last 
visited Jan. 3, 2012). 
 42  See Nicholas & Young, supra note 7, at xvii. 
 43  See, e.g., Whitney Debevoise, Key Procedural Issues: Transparency—Access to 
Documents and Panel and Appellate Body Sessions: Practice and Suggestions for Greater 
Transparency, 32 INT’L L. 817, 837–38 (1998) (discussing a case where NGOs prepared 
amicus briefs covering environmental issues that were not addressed by arbitrating parties). 
 44  See id. 
 45  See Dora Marta Gruner, Accounting for the Public Interest in International 
 Northwestern Journal of  
International Law & Business 33:439 (2013) 
448 
the quality and availability of information leads to better, more informed 
decision-making.  The Working Group II on Arbitration and Conciliation 
has thus expressed broad support for greater transparency in investor-State 
arbitrations, which invariably affect the public interest.
46
 
IV. NAFTA & ICSID: THE MOVEMENT TOWARDS 
TRANSPARENCY 
The transparency movement has received significant traction over the 
past decade as evidenced by the application of transparency standards by a 
number of arbitral institutions, countries, and investment agreements.
47
  The 
trend in increasing transparency signifies an accord among members of the 
public that they recognize a legitimate public interest in investment 
arbitration.
48
  In tracing the evolution of increased expectation for greater 
transparency and openness in international investment arbitration, this Part 
examines how NAFTA Chapter Eleven arbitrations—including the NAFTA 
Free Trade Commission’s Interpretations and Guidelines, and the 2006 
Amendments to ICSID Rules—have taken the lead in this area.  An 
examination of how transparency standards operate under NAFTA 
arbitrations and ICSID Rules serves various purposes for this Comment. 
Most importantly, it highlights the growing trend in investor-State 
arbitration towards greater transparency, and provides precedential value 
that may be instructive for the UNCITRAL in formulating and applying its 
own transparency standards. 
Notably, UNCITRAL cannot draw a direct analogy from existing 
transparency standards, because the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules differ 
 
Arbitration: The Need for Procedural and Structural Reform, 41 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 
923, 955–56 (2003). 
 46  The Working Group II agreed to the importance of transparency upon considering 
written observations that addressed public interest policy.  See, e.g., U.N. Comm’n on Int’l 
Trade Law Secretariat, Settlement of Commercial Disputes, Revision of the UNCITRAL 
Arbitration Rules, Observations by the Government of Canada, ¶ 8, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/662 
(June 12, 2008) (“Investment arbitration often implicates the public interest and government 
policy in ways simply not salient in commercial arbitration.”). 
 47  For example, the permissibility of amicus curiae participation has been supported by 
the practice of NAFTA, the Iran-United States Claims tribunal, and the World Trade 
Organization.  When looking at the most recent versions of prominent national model BITs, 
disclosure policies applied by NAFTA countries, and recent practice of investor-State 
arbitration tribunals, there is currently a general trend towards transparency in international 
investment arbitration.  Barton Legum, Trends and Challenges in Investor-State Arbitration, 
19 ARB. INT’L 143, 144 (2003); see generally Eugenia Levine, Amicus Curiae in 
International Investment Arbitration: The Implications of an Increase in Third Party 
Participation, 29 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 200 (2011). 
 48  Ruth Teitelbaum, A Look At The Public Interest In Investment Arbitration: Is It 
Unique? What Should We Do About It?, 5 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. PUBLICIST 54, 54 (2010), 
available at http://bjil.typepad.com/teitelbaum_final-1.pdf. 
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from the ICSID Rules and NAFTA Chapter Eleven guidelines in a 
nontrivial way: UNCITRAL Rules operate in ad hoc arbitrations and are not 
limited to any treaty’s States signatories.49  In contrast, ICSID Rules 
facilitate institutional rather than ad hoc arbitration, meaning that ICSID 
services and conducts arbitrations under the supervision of its established 
arbitral institution.
50
  The particular advantages of an ad hoc versus 
institutional arbitration appeal to different audiences; accordingly, 
distinguishing attributes are oftentimes desired.  However, the ways in 
which  NAFTA’s and ICSID’s transparency standards furnish the public 
with greater access to investment arbitrations act as a point of reference for 
structuring transparency rules in other contexts, including the ad hoc 
arbitrations conducted under the UNCITRAL Rules.  Thereon, the 
UNCITRAL can determine whether its Arbitration Rules should remain 
consistent with or depart from current practices. 
A.  NAFTA at the Helm of the Transparency Movement 
The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) represents “the 
most concerted effort to date to increase transparency and reduce or 
eliminate confidentiality in investor-State proceedings.”51  NAFTA is a 
trilateral free trade deal among the United States, Canada, and Mexico.
52
  
NAFTA Chapter Eleven specifically deals with investment treaties, and 
allows individuals or corporations to sue any signatories of the NAFTA 
when an investment is adversely impacted by government action.
53
  This 
subpart highlights: (1) the progressive steps taken by NAFTA parties to 
achieve greater public disclosure of arbitral proceedings; and (2) how the 
NAFTA regime has pushed arbitration proceedings into the open forum 
through guidelines and interpretations.  Notably, the force of NAFTA 
guidelines or interpretations is weighted against the rules administered by 
 
 49  Born & Shenkman, supra note 26; North American Free Trade Agreement § 1B et 
seq., Dec. 17, 1992, 107 Stat. 2057, 32 I.L.M. 289, available at http://www.nafta-sec-
alena.org/en/view.aspx?x=343&mtpiID=142#A1115 [hereinafter NAFTA]. 
 50  See A Primer on International Arbitration, COVINGTON & BURLING 5 (May 1998), 
http://www.cov.com/files/Publication/f394b11c-381d-4838-a6e2-
02812ed6b093/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/969db08e-5cc1-4f3f-a72e-
034ca2c8e9b2/oid6181.PDF (“Institutions that employ professional staffs can provide a wide 
range of services that may not be available in an ad hoc arbitration.  For instance, institutions 
can act as appointing authorities when parties cannot agree on the appointment of a sole 
arbitrator, or when party-appointed arbitrators cannot agree on the appointment of a neutral 
arbitrator.  They also can supervise proceedings, assist the arbitrators when necessary, fix the 
remuneration of arbitrators, and collect any advances against the costs of arbitration.”). 
 51  Born & Shenkman, supra note 26, at 31. 
 52  Lee Hudson Teslik, NAFTA’s Economic Impact, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL. (July 7, 
2009), http://www.cfr.org/economics/naftas-economic-impact/p15790#p2. 
 53  NAFTA, supra note 49, arts. 1116–1117. 
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ICSID, ICSID Additional Facility, or UNCITRAL selected by the investor 
in the arbitration. 
1.  NAFTA’s Progressive Measures 
NAFTA Chapter Eleven’s arbitration regime has given attention to 
policies that make transparency a critical part of investor-State arbitrations 
involving NAFTA governments.  In particular, NAFTA Chapter Eleven has 
favorably addressed the issues of public access to documents, third-party 
participation,
54
 and open hearings.
55
 
On July 31, 2001, the NAFTA Free Trade Commission (NAFTA 
FTC), pursuant to its authority to interpret NAFTA provisions, issued an 
interpretation in favor of public access to documents (Document Access 
Interpretation).
56
  The NAFTA FTC, comprised of Trade Ministers from 
each of the three NAFTA governments, states in its Document Access 
Interpretation that “[n]othing in the NAFTA imposes a general duty of 
confidentiality on the disputing parties to a Chapter Eleven 
arbitration . . . .”57  The Document Access Interpretation further states: 
Each Party agrees to make available to the public in a timely manner 
all documents submitted to . . . a Chapter Eleven tribunal, subject to 
redaction of: (i) confidential business information; (ii) information 
which is privileged or otherwise protected from disclosure under the 
Party’s domestic law . . . .
58
 
The Document Access Interpretation clarified NAFTA’s endorsement 
for public access to documents generated during investor-State arbitrations 
held in Chapter Eleven tribunals.  In the aftermath of the Interpretation, 
Chapter Eleven tribunals have effectively put into practice the standard for 
public document disclosure: the public has nearly unfettered access to 




 54  See Press Release, Office of the U.S. Trade Rep., NAFTA Commission Announces 
New Transparency Measures (Oct. 7, 2003), http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/press-
office/press-releases/archives/2003/october/nafta-commission-announces-new-transparen. 
 55  See Statement on Open Hearings in NAFTA Chapter Eleven Arbitrations, U.S. TRADE 
REPRESENTATIVE (Oct. 7, 2003), 
http://www.ustr.gov/archive/assets/Trade_Agreements/Regional/NAFTA/asset_upload_file1
43_3602.pdf. 
 56  NAFTA Free Trade Comm’n, Notes on Interpretation of Certain Chapter 11 
Provisions, U.S. DEP’T ST. (July 31, 2001), 
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/38790.pdf.  NAFTA FTC interpretations are 
binding on NAFTA Chapter 11 tribunals.  NAFTA, supra note 49, art. 1131. 
 57  NAFTA Free Trade Comm’n, supra note 56, ¶ A.1. 
 58  Id. ¶ A.2(b) 
 59  Andrea J. Menaker, Piercing the Veil of Confidentiality: The Recent Trend Towards 
Greater Public Participation and Transparency in Investor-State Arbitration, in 
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The practice of allowing non-disputing parties to file written 
submissions has also gained substantial ground with NAFTA Chapter 
Eleven arbitrations.  The Canadian government recently submitted a 
comment to the UNCITRAL Working Group, stating that “Canada’s 
experience . . . with respect to amicus curiae participation is that, as long as 
reasonable limits are established, amicus submissions can be a benefit for 
the [t]ribunal.”60  In this regard, the NAFTA FTC issued a Statement of the 
Free Trade Commission on Non-disputing Party Participation in 2003 
(Non-disputing Party Statement).
61
  In this Statement, the NAFTA FTC 
provided the following interpretation: 
1. No provision of [NAFTA] limits a tribunal’s discretion to accept 
written submissions from a person or entity that is not a disputing 
party . . . . 
2. Nothing in this statement by the [FTC] prejudices the rights of 
NAFTA Parties under Article 1128 of the NAFTA.
62
 
According to the Non-disputing Party Statement, the tribunal has the 
discretion to determine whether an interested amicus is to participate: “The 
disputing parties are permitted to comment on whether the tribunal should 
grant leave for the amicus to file, but the tribunal may, in principle, accept 
the submission over the objection of both disputing parties.”63  The Non-
disputing Party Statement recommends that: 
[I]n exercising its discretion, the tribunal should consider a number 
of factors designed to help it determine whether or not the amicus 
submission will be helpful to the tribunal—these include whether the 
amicus has knowledge or insight different from the parties and 




Recognizing that written submissions by non-disputing parties may 
affect the operation of Chapter Eleven arbitration, the Non-disputing Party 
 
ARBITRATION UNDER INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS: A GUIDE TO THE KEY 
ISSUES 129, 134 (Katia Yannaca-Small ed., 2010). 
 60  U.N. Comm’n on Int’l Trade Law Secretariat, Settlement of Commercial Disputes, 
Transparency in Treaty-based Investor-State Arbitration, Comments of the Governments of 
Canada and of the United States of America on Transparency in Treaty-Based Investor-State 
Arbitration Under Chapter Eleven of the North American Free Trade Agreement, § 1.III, at 
4, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/WG.II/WP.163 (Dec. 7, 2010). 
 61  Statement of the Free Trade Commission on Non-Disputing Party Participation, 
NAFTA FREE TRADE COMMISSION (Oct. 7, 2003), http://www.international.gc.ca/trade-
agreements-accords-commerciaux/assets/pdfs/Nondisputing-en.pdf. 
 62  Id. ¶ A. 
 63  U.N. Comm’n on Int’l Trade Law Secretariat, supra note 60. 
 64  Id. 
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Statement also contains detailed, nonbinding65 guidelines for evaluating 
amicus petitions: “an interested amicus must request leave to file a 
submission, amicus submissions must be in written form and must be 
attached to the application for leave, and the submission cannot be more 
than [twenty] pages in length.  In preparing submissions, amicus have 
access only to the publicly available documents.”66 
Finally, the initiative for open hearings in investor-State arbitrations 
under NAFTA Chapter Eleven has also seen incremental progress since the 
NAFTA FTC issued a statement in October 2003 consenting to open all 
Chapter Eleven hearings to the public (Open Hearings Statement).
67
   The 
Open Hearings Statement provides that “hearings in Chapter Eleven 
disputes [must] be open to the public, except to ensure the protection of 
confidential information, including business confidential information.”68  
The Open Hearings Statement recommends several possible arrangements 
for open hearings, such as closed-circuit television systems and online 
webcasting.
69
  The NAFTA regime’s pioneering movement towards a more 
transparent arbitration regime—through its endorsement of public 
disclosure of documents, third party participation, and open hearings—has 
been influential in the international community of investment arbitrations. 
2.  Limitations of NAFTA’s Interpretations 
As a leader of the transparency movement, the NAFTA FTC has 
issued interpretations promoting obligations of transparency in investor-
State treaties in the form of statements and guidelines.  The issued 
statements and guidelines are somewhat constrained, however, because 
disputing parties are still subject to the administering rules selected at the 
time of arbitration.
70
  Treaties referencing ICSID Rules, ICSID Additional 
Facility Rules, or UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules are bound by legal 
standards set forth by the relevant institution or intergovernmental 
 
 65  Menaker, supra note 59, at 143. 
 66  U.N. Comm’n on Int’l Trade Law Secretariat, supra note 60. 
 67  See Statement on Open Hearings in NAFTA Chapter Eleven Arbitrations, supra note 
55. 
 68  Settlement of Disputes Between a Party and an Investor of Another Party, FOREIGN 
AFF. & INT’L TRADE CAN., http://www.international.gc.ca/trade-agreements-accords-
commerciaux/disp-diff/nafta-transparency-alena-transparence.aspx?lang=en&view=d (last 
visited Jan. 3, 2013). 
 69 Id. 
 70  As an example of a case that involved a NAFTA dispute that proceeded under the 
UNCITRAL Rules, Methanex was the first case to recognize the “privilege” of third parties 
to participate as amicus curiae in investment arbitration proceedings.  Methanex Corp. v. 
United States, Decision of the Tribunal on Petitions from Third Persons to Intervene as 
Amici Curiae, ¶¶ 52–53 (NAFTA Arb. Trib. Jan. 15, 2001), available at 
http://www.iisd.org/pdf/methanex_tribunal_first_amicus_decision.pdf. 
 UNCITRAL’s Unclear Transparency Instrument 
33:439 (2013) 
453 
organization.  The investor-State arbitration mechanism, set forth in 
NAFTA Chapter Eleven, does not provide express provisions addressing 
any obligations of confidentiality or public disclosure during the arbitral 
process.
71
  Where NAFTA’s text and the governing arbitration rules are 
silent on such obligations, relevant administering rules may explicitly state 
otherwise.  For example, a private investor may initiate an arbitration 
against a NAFTA party before a Chapter Eleven tribunal under the 
UNCITRAL Rules.  In such a case, NAFTA’s texts have been silent on 
issues of public document disclosure and third-party participation, but open 
hearings are subject to the governing UNCITRAL Rule, which states that 
“[h]earings shall be held in camera unless the parties agree otherwise.”72  
Despite NAFTA’s consent to open hearings, the UNCITRAL Rules require 
the claimant party to consent before hearings can be made open.
73
  Such 
consent has been given in some, but not all cases.
74
  Consequently, the 
NAFTA regime’s initiative for open hearings in investment arbitrations has 
seen only marginal change.   
In light of this, UNCITRAL, in determining the form, applicability, 
and content of its transparency standards, should note that legal standards in 
the form of rules have greater authority than guidelines or interpretations.  
NAFTA’s interpretations and recommendations on third-party participation, 
open hearings, and public disclosures are nonbinding.  However, the 
standards relating to these issues that UNCITRAL administers can have the 
force of binding rules if desired. 
B.  ICSID’s Newly Amended Rules Designed to Achieve Greater 
Transparency 
The majority of investor-State arbitrations have been administered by 
the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID):  
more than sixty percent of investment arbitrations proceed under the ICSID 
Arbitration Rules or ICSID Additional Facility Rules.
75
  Therefore, it is 
worthwhile to examine how ICSID has addressed the demand for greater 
transparency by incorporating several amendments into its rules. 
ICSID amended its arbitration rules in 2006 to address the growing 
popularity of investor-State arbitrations (2006 ICSID Amendments).  The 
 
 71  Id. ¶¶ 9, 24, 38, 39. 
 72  2010 UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, supra note 13, art. 28(3).  For another example, 
the Mondev tribunal prohibited the United States from publishing on its website a tribunal 
order and interim decision pursuant to the then-existing ICSID Additional Facility Rule in 
Article 44(2).  Mondev Int’l Ltd. v. United States of America, ICSID Case No. 
ARB(AF)/99/2, Award, ¶¶ 26, 28 (Oct. 11, 2002), 6 ICSID Rep. 192 (2004). 
 73  Menaker, supra note 59, at 155. 
 74  See, e.g., U.N. Comm’n on Int’l Trade Law Secretariat, supra note 60, at 12. 
 75  Born & Shenkman, supra note 26. 
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number of bilateral treaties arbitrated under the ICSID convention has 
exploded in recent years.
76
  Investors have been equipped with the right to 
bring ICSID arbitration claims against States based on “[n]umerous 
multilateral agreements, such as the Energy Charter Treaty, NAFTA, and 
the recently-concluded Central American Free Trade Agreement 
(CAFTA).”77  The 2006 ICSID Amendments were “intended to make 
ICSID proceedings more streamlined and transparent, while instilling 
greater confidence in the arbitral process.”78 
1.  ICSID’S Progressive Measures 
ICSID implemented several rule changes to satisfy demands for 
increased access to investor-State arbitration proceedings by the public.  
ICSID aims to achieve greater transparency via amicus submissions by 
third parties, public attendance at oral hearings, and publication of awards. 
ICSID has provided new standards and procedures that enable greater 
public participation in investment arbitrations.  The 2006 ICSID 
Amendments require tribunals to consider third-party requests to file 
amicus briefs so that issues inadequately addressed by treaty parties may 
have an opportunity to be addressed by the broader public.  For example, 
there are issues that may arise in an arbitration proceeding that may be 
overlooked by the treaty parties themselves, but that may be significant to 
the public at large, such as environmental or trade issues.  ICSID does not 
restrict the type of third parties that may make a submission as indicated by 
its reference to non-disputing parties as any “persons or entity”79 that meets 
certain requirements.  The broad wording of “persons or entity” is inclusive 
of private citizens, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), business 
organizations, and local and national governments.  Moreover, the 2006 
ICSID Amendments have made great strides towards transparency by 
authorizing tribunals to accept amicus submissions by third parties even if 
both parties object.  However, the tribunal is required to consult both parties 





 76  Gary Born et al., Investment Treaty Arbitration: ICSID Amends Investor-State 
Arbitration Rules, WILMERHALE (Apr. 14, 2006), 
http://www.wilmerhale.com/pages/publicationsandNewsDetail.aspx?NewsPubId=90393. 
 77  Id. 
 78  Id. 
 79  “After consulting both parties, the tribunal may allow a person or entity that is not a 
party to the dispute . . . to file a written submission with the tribunal regarding a matter 
within the scope of the dispute.”  Int’l Ctr. for Settlement of Inv. Disputes [ICSID], ICSID 
Convention, Regulations and Rules, rule 37(2), at 117, ICSID Doc. ICSID/15 (Apr. 2006), 
available at https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/StaticFiles/basicdoc/CRR_English-final.pdf 
[hereinafter ICSID Rules]. 
 80  Id. 
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In addition to amicus submissions, the 2006 ICSID Amendments 
address transparency objectives by opening ICSID hearings to the public.
81
  
Transparency advocates, such as NGOs and civil society organizations, 
have pushed for open hearings to persons other than those directly involved 
in the arbitration proceeding.
82
  The revised rules partly meet this demand 
by giving tribunals the power to permit persons besides the parties and their 
agents to attend the hearings, or even open them to the public, but only with 
the consent of both parties.
83
  The rule is still mindful of certain 
confidentiality concerns, as it requires tribunals presiding over open 
proceedings to “establish procedures for the protection of proprietary or 
privileged information.”84 
The 2006 ICSID Amendments also further ICSID’s transparency 
objectives by instituting a rule that facilitates the timely publication of 
awards by making such publication mandatory.
85
  The revised rule prohibits 
ICSID from publishing an award without the consent of both parties.
86
  If 
there is no consent between the parties, ICSID must promptly publish 
excerpts of the legal conclusions of the tribunal.
87
  In contrast, the old rules 
authorized but did not mandate ICSID to publish excerpts of the awards that 
revealed the tribunal’s reasoning.88  Moreover, in the old rules, there were 
no provisions as to the promptness in publishing legal excerpts of the 
awards, occasionally leading to delayed publications that took several 
months.
89
  In publicizing basic information “on every investor-State dispute 
that it registers, ICSID arbitration distinguishes itself from most other forms 
of international arbitration, where the existence of a dispute . . . is not made 
public contemporaneously and may remain permanently confidential.”90 
ICSID has revised its rules to further its objective of streamlining 
 
 81  Id. rule 32, at 115. 
 82  See, e.g., CTR. FOR INT’L ENVTL. LAW & INT’L INST. FOR SUSTAINABLE DEV., supra 
note 35 (commenting on the initiatives of the Center for International Environmental Law 
and the International Institute for Sustainable Development). 
 83  “Unless either party objects, the tribunal, after consultation with the Secretary-
General, may allow other persons, besides the parties, their agents, counsel and advocates, 
witnesses and experts during their testimony, and officers of the tribunal, to attend or 
observe all or part of the hearings . . . .”  ICSID Rules, supra note 79, rule 32(2), at 115. 
 84  Id. 
 85  Andrew de Lotbinière McDougall & Ank Santens, ICSID Amends Its Arbitration 




 86  ICSID Rules, supra note 79, rule 48, at 122. 
 87  Id. 
 88  Tuck, supra note 16, at 900. 
 89  Id. 
 90  Born & Shenkman, supra note 26. 
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greater transparency.  The 2006 ICSID Amendments—by promoting 
amicus participation, open hearings, and publication of awards—are 
significant changes to its existing rules and will affect the greater majority 
of investment arbitrations that proceed under ICSID. 
2.  ICSID’s Transparency Rules in Amended Form 
Unlike NAFTA guidelines and interpretations, the 2006 ICSID 
Amendments are binding on arbitrations subject to the institution.  The 
rules governing transparency, effective as of April 10, 2006, were directly 
incorporated into the existing 1966 version of the ICSID rules, giving the 
Amendments binding force.
91
  Rather than having issued interpretive 
statements favoring greater transparency, ICSID designed transparency 
standards as revisions to its existing regulations.  ICSID goes further in 
administering new transparency standards.  The 2006 ICSID Amendments 
apply to disputes that arise on or after the effective date, even if the 
investment treaties themselves were signed prior to 2006.
92
 
The 2006 ICSID Amendments were a response to the proliferation of 
investor-State arbitrations and the evolution of the growing body of 
international investment law.  ICSID departed from the previously 
prevailing trend of dealing with transparency issues in the context of 
voluntary guidelines for foreign investors.  Rather, it sought to legitimize its 
transparency objectives and give the revised rules a binding effect.  
Likewise, in order for UNCITRAL to reach its objective in promoting 
greater transparency to ad hoc arbitrations, its transparency standards 
should be crafted and administered as rules so that they have a greater 
governing force than guidelines and interpretations. 
V. UNCITRAL’S COMMITMENT TO ESTABLISHING 
TRANSPARENCY STANDARDS 
The incorporation of transparency standards into the current 
UNCITRAL Rules signifies no small change or minimal effort by the 
Commission.  In 2010, UNCITRAL adopted a new version of its 
Arbitration Rules thirty-four years after their inception.  The adoption of the 
2010 UNCITRAL Rules concluded four years of drafting work by 
UNCITRAL’s Arbitration Working Group, which produced important 
additions to the text after thorough debates and deliberations during the 
 
 91  For example, subsection (2) of Rule 37 is a completely new addition to the 1966 
version of the rule.  Subsection (2) of Rule 37, which deals with submissions of non-
disputing parties, has been incorporated in its entirety as an amendment to the old rule.  See 
ICSID Rules, supra note 79, rule 37(2), at 117.  The rule was previously only concerned 
with the tribunal’s ability to visit places connected to the dispute.  
 92  Born et al., supra note 76. 
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eight weeks of its meeting.
93
  The Working Group II approached the task of 
revising the already functional and largely successful UNCITRAL 
Arbitration Rules with the rule of consensus: “no revision was adopted 
unless it garnered virtually unanimous support among the delegates.”94  
Though the rule of consensus required lengthy debates, “it was crucial to 
obtaining broad acceptance of the revisions within the international 
community.”95 
Likewise, the Working Group II approached the adoption of a 
transparency standard—which will affect all states arbitrating under 
UNCITRAL Rules—with the principle that broad-based support is required 
for effective implementation of existing and future treaties.  The Working 
Group II is, therefore, composed of varied interests and governments.
96
  To 
further garner broad international support for transparency standards, the 
Working Group II operated on a consent-based approach.
97
  This approach 
strategically allows future users of newly revised or introduced rules to 
“take comfort from the fact that representatives from a wide range of legal 
and economic systems have approved them.”98 
The issue of the need for greater transparency with the rise of investor-
State arbitration under the UNCITRAL Rules received great attention in the 
Working Group sessions, transparency standards were eventually tabled for 
 
 93  Working Group II is one of six working groups “undertak[ing] the substantive 
preparatory work on [various] topics” covered by the UNCITRAL program.  FAQ—Methods 
of Work, UNITED NATIONS COMMISSION ON INT’L TRADE L., 
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/about/methods_faq.html (last visited Jan. 3, 2013).  
Working Group II, was designated to work on drafting the 2010 UNCITRAL Rules.  See 
Levine, supra note 17, at 268.  Working Group II has now been tasked with setting a 
standard on transparency in treaty-based investor-State arbitrations.  U.N. Comm’n on Int’l 
Trade Law Rep. of Working Group II (Arbitration and Conciliation on the work of its 55th 
Sess., Oct. 3–7, 2011, ¶ 1, U.N. DOC. A/CN.9/736 (Oct. 17, 2011).  For a list of all six 
working groups and their respective tasks, see Working Group Documents, UNITED NATIONS 
COMMISSION ON INT’L TRADE L., 
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/commission/working_groups.html (last visited Jan. 3, 
2013). 
 94  James E. Castello, Unveiling the 2010 UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, 65 J. DISP. 
RESOL., May/Oct. 2010, at 21, 21. 
 95  Id. 
 96  Working Group II is composed primarily of delegations from the sixty member States 
of UNCITRAL as well as observer groups from arbitral institutions and think tanks.  Levine, 
supra note 17, at 268.  The composition of this working group reflects growing collaboration 
among governments, organizations, and practitioners.  Id. at 269.  Among those in 
attendance at the Working Group II sessions were a host of observers from the United 
Nations System, international intergovernmental organizations, and international non-
governmental organizations.  Id. at 268–69; see also Report of the Working Group Fifty-
Fourth Session, supra note 3, ¶¶ 5–9. 
 97  See Castello, supra note 92, at 21. 
 98  Id. 
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future discussion.  In launching the revision project, the Working Group 
was “tasked by UNCITRAL to ‘modernize the Rules and to promote greater 
efficiency in arbitral proceedings.’”99  The “focus of the revision should be 
on updating the Rules to meet changes that had taken place over the last 
thirty years in arbitral practice,” not to radically change the UNCITRAL 
Rules’ form and substance100: 
In recognition of the success and status of the UNCITRAL 
Arbitration Rules, the Commission was generally of the view that 
any revision of the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules should not alter 
the structure of the text, its spirit or its drafting style, and should 




Thus, the updates were designed to accommodate developments in arbitral 




While the 2008 New York Working Group meeting saw broad support 
for the principle of greater transparency in investor-State arbitrations that 
affect the public interest, it was agreed that such changes should not be 
introduced until after the passage of the 2010 UNCITRAL Rules.  The 
reason for shelving transparency reforms until after completion of the 2010 
UNCITRAL Rules was that UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules largely apply to 
commercial arbitration, while only a small percentage arise under 
investment treaties. 
Broad support for transparency standards was not met without serious 
concerns.  While the Working Group II expressed general agreement 
“regarding the desirability of dealing with transparency in investor-State 
arbitration, which differ[s] from purely private arbitration, where 
confidentiality was an essential feature,”103 there were reservations about 
issuing full transparency in all respects, as investor-State arbitrations are but 
one type of arbitration to which UNCITRAL Rules apply.  The Working 
Group therefore concluded, for the purposes of the current round of 
proposed rule changes, that “it would not be desirable to include specific 
 
 99  Levine, supra note 17, at 269. 
 100 U.N. Comm’n on Int’l Trade Law Secretariat, Settlement of Commercial Disputes: 
Revision of the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, ¶ 5, U.N. DOC. A/CN.9/WG.II/WP.145 (Dec. 
6, 2006). 
 101 Rep. of the U.N. Comm’n on Int’l Trade Law, 39th Sess., June 19–July 7, 2006, ¶ 
184, U.N. DOC. A/61/17; GAOR, 61st Sess., Supp. No. 17 (2006). 
 102 See, e.g., Kate Davies, Meeting the Challenge: Efficiency and Flexibility in 
International Commercial Arbitration, in THE INTERNATIONAL COMPARATIVE LEGAL GUIDE 
TO: INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 2011, at 1, 1 (Steven Finizio & Wendy Miles eds., 2011). 
 103 Report of the Working Group Forty-Eighth Session, supra note 2. 
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provisions on treaty-based arbitration in the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules 
themselves.”104 
After revisions to the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules were issued in 
2010, the Commission revisited the complex but worthy issue of creating 
transparency standards for investor-State arbitrations.  After much 
deliberation, the Working Group II reached a consensus in February 2013 
as to the form, application, and content of the new transparency 
standards.
105
  Rather than probing these proposed standards that still face 
additional scrutiny,
106
 this Part discusses the policy considerations 
underlying the finalized draft.  Importantly, this Part advocates for adopting 
an approach that best pursues UNCITRAL’s objectives while preserving 
party autonomy—even if such a rubric scales back the broadest application 
of the transparency standards.   
A.  The Form of New Legal Transparency Standards 
The Working Group has the discretion to determine the form of its 
future work product on transparency standards.
107
  Determining the form of 
the new legal standards is both a technical and policy-driven exercise.  
Form selection is technical in one sense because transparency standards can 
take shape in only one of many forms, and policy-driven in another sense 
because the selected form will affect the drafting style and application of 
transparency standards.
108
  Among the possibilities of instruments are 
“model clauses, specific rules or guidelines, an annex to the UNCITRAL 
Arbitration Rules in their generic form, separate arbitration rules or optional 
clauses for adoption in specific treaties.”109 
Much debate over the issue of form has transpired among Working 
 
 104 Id. ¶ 69. 
 105 See U.N. Comm’n on Int’l Trade Law Rep. of Working Group (Arbitration and 
Conciliation) on the work of its 58th Sess., New York, U.S., Feb. 4–8, 2013, ¶¶ 75–80, U.N. 
Doc. A/CN.9/765 (Feb. 13, 2013) [hereinafter Report of the Working Group Fifty-Eighth 
Session].  The Working Group II met in October 2012 and reached a consensus on some, but 
not all, the transparency issues raised.  Johnson, supra note 14.  The Working Group II 
reconvened in early February 2013 where it finalized a draft proposal of the rules.  Peterson, 
supra note 14.  The proposal still needs to be approved by the Commission at its next 
meeting in July 2013 and amended into the 2010 UNCITRAL Rules.  Id. 
 106 The proposed standards “must still be subjected to a ‘legal scrub’ and then approved 
by the UNCITRAL Commission at its next meeting in July [2013] . . . .”  Peterson, supra 
note 14.  The Working Group II reached a consensus on new standards “that will apply on a 
default basis to UNCITRAL arbitrations pursuant to future investment treaties – unless the 
parties to a given treaty expressly opt-out.”  Id.  For more details on the proposed rules, see 
Report of the Working Group Fifty-Eighth Session, supra note 105. 
 107 See Report of the Working Group Fifty-Fourth Session, supra note 3, ¶ 1. 
 108 Id. ¶ 24. 
 109 Id. 
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Group II delegates, as well as NGOs and leading international arbitrators, 
over the past half-decade.  The issue has largely rested on whether and how 
to incorporate new transparency standards into the UNCITRAL Arbitration 
Rules.   While the drafters of the 1976 UNCITRAL Rules consciously 
designed the Rules generically to allow for adjustments to the “varied 
circumstances” that arise in investor-State arbitrations, the Rules were 
primarily intended to govern commercial disputes and did not contemplate 
the public interest and international law issues that come up.
110
 
On October 12, 2007, more than forty renowned international 
arbitrators signed and issued a declaration (Milan Declaration) through the 
Chamber of National and International Arbitration of Milan.
111
  The 
proponents of the Milan Declaration advocate for preserving confidentiality 
in international commercial arbitration and excluding any investor-State 
provisions from the generic UNCITRAL Rules.
112
  It expresses reservations 
about the possible inclusion of transparency provisions in the UNCITRAL 
Arbitration Rules.  Many delegates hold the view that the generic nature of 
the Rules needs to be preserved and that full transparency in all 
circumstances is not desirable.
113
  Rather than incorporating specific 
provisions into the UNCITRAL Rules, some delegates support the 
utilization of investment treaties to expressly deal with issues surrounding 
more open dealings.  This alternative would “better allow States to reflect 
such circumstances”114 and accommodate the desire for greater 
transparency based on individual treaties.  Others support preparing “one or 
more optional clauses to address specific factors for investor-State 
arbitration[s] . . . for consideration by States when negotiating such 
treaties.”115 
A contrasting viewpoint on the form for transparency standards has 
been expressed by two prominent NGOs: the Centre for International 
Environmental Law (CIEL) and the International Institute for Sustainable 
 
 110 PAULSSON & PETROCHILOS, supra note 8, at 1–4; Sutcliffe & Sabater, supra note 11. 
 111 Sutcliffe & Sabater, supra note 11, at 33–34. 
 112 See Report of the Working Group Forty-Eighth Session, supra note 2, annex II (“The 
members of the Milan Club of Arbitrators: 1) reaffirmed their support for the general 
principle of confidentiality in international commercial arbitrations and, in particular, in 
arbitrations taking place under the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules; 2) supported the current 
proposals in the Working Group to exclude from the new UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules any 
specific provision for investor-State arbitrations; [and] 3) recommended that one or more 
optional clauses be formulated by UNCITRAL to address specific factors for investor-State 
arbitrations taking place under investment treaties, consistent with the new UNCITRAL 
Arbitration Rules . . . .”). 
 113 Id. ¶ 60. 
 114 Id. 
 115 Id. 





  CIEL and IISD submitted a report (CIEL-IISD 
Report) to the Working Group calling for greater transparency of 
investment arbitration cases conducted under the UNCITRAL Rules “so 
that citizens know what is at stake[,] . . .  can be informed about the 
outcome[,] . . .  [and] have the opportunity to provide input to an investor-
State tribunal.”117  In order to accomplish the stated objectives, the CIEL-
IISD Report proposed revision of the UNCITRAL Rules themselves, 
revisions centered on issues of access to awards, access to the notice of 
arbitration, access to oral hearings, access to materials during proceedings, 
and third-party participation.
118
  The CIEL-IISD Report claims that direct 
incorporation of these revisions in the Rules “would not affect the 
resolution of commercial disputes”119 but would avoid “undue delay, 
disruption or cost” by leaving untouched the application of the Rules to 
other types of arbitrations.
120
 
The view advocated by CIEL and IISD has been countered by a 
concern that the proposal to directly revise several UNCITRAL Rules is 
overly simplistic when dealing with the complexities of transparency 
issues.
121
  The complexities in dealing with transparency require more than 
amending a few provisions in the UNCITRAL Rules, as there are “other 
aspects that might need to be dealt with in investor-State arbitration, such as 
the question of applicable law, or State immunity.”122 
In balancing these views, it appears the Working Group II was intent 
on including a specific regime to the UNCITRAL Rules in the form of an 
annex or a supplement.
123
  The transparency standards would only apply in 
the context of investment arbitrations, while the general regime of the 
UNCITRAL Rules would remain unchanged with respect to commercial 
arbitrations.  While suggestions on the form of transparency standards have 
varied, there has been general consensus that investment arbitrations have 
different needs from commercial arbitrations, and that the UNCITRAL 
Rules are designed to address the latter.
124
  An annex or supplement to the 
 
 116 Report of the Working Group Forty-Eighth Session, supra note 2, annex III. 
 117 Id. 
 118 Id. 
 119 CTR. FOR INT’L ENVTL. LAW & INT’L INST. FOR SUSTAINABLE DEV., REVISING THE 
UNCITRAL ARBITRATION RULES TO ADDRESS STATE ARBITRATIONS (2007),  available at 
http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2007/investment_revising_uncitral_arbitration.pdf. 
 120 Report of the Working Group Forty-Eighth Session, supra note 2, annex III. 
 121 Id. ¶ 66. 
 122 Id. 
 123 The form of an annex to the existing UNCITRAL Rules was most supported by 
delegates of Working Group II.  Pedro Martini, Full Report on the 53rd Session of the 
UNCITRAL Working Group II (Arbitration and Conciliation), MOOT ALUMNI ASS’N 11 (Oct. 
4, 2010), http://www.maa.net/uploads/MAA_Docs/WGII_full_report.pdf. 
 124 Id. at 2–3. 
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generic UNCITRAL Rules would address the need for greater openness in 
investment arbitrations while leaving the integrity of the general rules 
unchanged.  Moreover, an annex would allow for more flexibility in 
addressing complex transparency issues, such as exemptions to certain 
rules, than the alternative of fitting all transparency issues into the existing 
framework of the UNCITRAL Rules. 
Thus, constructing transparency standards in the form of an annex to 
the UNCITRAL Rules would restrict the sphere of application of the new 
transparency standards to UNCITRAL arbitrations.  While the scope of the 
legal standards can be broadened by taking shape in the form of a Model 
Law,
125
 packaging the transparency standards as an annex appropriately 
applies them to parties who have expressly selected to arbitrate their 
disputes under the UNCITRAL Rules.  This is critical to recognizing that 




B.  The Enforceability of Rules over Guidelines 
However the new transparency standards are ultimately incorporated 
into the UNCITRAL Rules—whether they are drafted as part of the existing 
rules in relevant clauses, or as a supplement in the form of an annex to the 
generic rules—the enforceability of new legal standards should be taken 
into consideration.  The weight of legal authority the new standards will 
have over investment treaties will depend on whether they take form as 
guidelines or stand-alone rules.
127
  The selection between guidelines or rules 
has other significant implications: it will drive the drafting style of the legal 
standard on transparency, and it will determine the force of the instrument’s 
application on disputing parties.  This Comment takes the position that in 
order to establish the legitimacy of transparency standards among the 
 
 125 The UNICTRAL Model Law is a nonbinding legal framework based on best 
principles of international arbitration.  Juliet Blanch, John Reynolds & Andy Moody, 
UNCITRAL and NY Convention, in ARBITRATION WORLD: JURISDICTIONAL COMPARISONS 
cxliii, clvii (J. William Rowley ed., 2d ed. 2006).  Since the U.N. Model Law is based on 
nonbinding principles, it has the capacity to have broader impact than binding laws as it is 
widely used as a tool for assisting the interpretation of national laws on arbitration.  Id.  The 
U.N. Model Law was created to encourage the harmonization of arbitration laws around the 
world and has been successful in that aim since its inception; over forty countries around the 
world have adopted the U.N. Model Law.  Id. 
 126 See Bjorklund, supra note 9, at 1270. 
 127 This Comment considers guidelines to be inclusive of model clauses and model 
statement of principle, distinguished from stand-alone rules.  For an example of the Working 
Group’s consideration of the forms of a legal standard on transparency, see Report of the 
Working Group Fifty-Fourth Session, supra note 3, ¶ 23; U.N. Comm’n on Int’l Trade Law 
Secretariat, Settlement of Commercial Disputes: Preparation of a Legal Standard on 
Transparency in Treaty-Based Investor-State Arbitration, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/WG.II/WP.162 
(Dec. 9, 2010). 
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international community, create a uniform application, and promote greater 
adoption of the standards, UNCITRAL should fashion its transparency 
standards in the form of rules instead of guidelines. 
1.  Guidelines as a Possibility 
Guidelines that outline legal standards on transparency would reflect 
the UNCITRAL’s understanding of the international best practice of 
promoting greater openness in investment arbitrations.  Guidelines would 
embrace principles of transparency and draw upon current practices, case 
law, and the experience of the Working Group II and others in international 
arbitration.
128
  Significantly, “guidelines are not legal provisions and do not 
override any applicable national law or arbitral rules chosen by the 
parties.”129 
The success in implementing guidelines hinges on their general 
acceptance by the international arbitration community, which requires 
broad-based support for the principles laid out in the instrument.
130
  
Guidelines can have a significant influence over arbitration proceedings; 
examples of guidelines that have seen success in their application to 
consenting parties include the International Bar Association Rules on the 
Taking of Evidence in International Arbitration and the UNIDROIT 
Principles of International Commercial Contracts (2004).
131
  The Working 
Group II hopes that its proposed guidelines will assist arbitrators, 
institutions, and courts in their decision-making and practice on the issue of 
transparency in investment arbitrations.
132
 
The Working Group II saw some support for guidelines at its fifty-
fourth working session held in New York.
133
  Germany presented arguments 
 
 128 See generally INT’L BAR ASS’N, IBA GUIDELINES ON CONFLICTS OF INTEREST IN 
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 5 (2004), available at 
http://www.ibanet.org/Document/Default.aspx?DocumentUid=E2FE5E72-EB14-4BBA-
B10D-D33DAFEE8918. 
 129 Id. 
 130 Id. 
 131 The IBA Rules on the Taking of Evidence and the Unidroit Principles of International 
Commercial Contract were submitted to the UNCITRAL Working Group II as examples of 
functional and effective guidelines.  Report of the Working Group Fifty-Fourth Session, 
supra note 3, ¶ 23; see generally IBA Rules on the Taking of Evidence, INT’L B. ASS’N (May 
29, 2010), 
http://www.ibanet.org/Publications/publications_IBA_guides_and_free_materials.aspx#conf
lictsofinterest; INT’L INST. FOR THE UNIFICATION OF PRIVATE LAW, UNIDROIT PRINCIPLES OF 
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS 2004 (2004), available at 
http://www.unidroit.org/english/principles/contracts/principles2004/blackletter2004.pdf. 
 132 See generally INT’L BAR ASS’N, supra note 128, at 5. 
 133 See, e.g., U.N. Comm’n on Int’l Trade Law Secretariat, Settlement of Commercial 
Disputes, Transparency in Treaty-Based Investor-State Arbitration: Proposals by 
Governments and International Organizations, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/WG.II/WP.164 (Dec. 20, 
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(German Proposal) in favor of legal transparency standards in the form of 
non-binding guidelines.
134
  The German delegation asserted that “non-
binding guidelines most closely comply with the principle of a party-
dominated process that underpins arbitration.”135  Furthermore, the German 
Proposal criticized the alternative of preparing an instrument in the form of 
rules.  The deliberation parties engage over whether to incorporate the new 
transparency standards in arbitration proceedings “would be contentious, 
possibly leading to additional expense and delays.”136 
The German Proposal mostly emphasized its desired objective to 
“establish the widest possible acceptance of transparency rules.”137  
According to the Proposal, non-binding guidelines would help achieve the 
stated objective by providing sufficient flexibility—unlike rigid, mandatory 
rules—in the ad hoc application of transparency standards to existing and 
future investment treaties.
138
  Guidelines would, under this view, effectuate 
a broader application of transparency standards than defined rules attached 
to UNCITRAL, because guidelines allow parties to incorporate 
transparency rules into their treaties regardless of the arbitration rules to 
which they submit their dispute.  The guidelines would apply to 
international treaties at the intergovernmental level and to private contracts 
between States and investors.
139
 
2.  The Case for Rules over Guidelines 
The case for designing transparency standards in the form of rules 
prevails over the form of guidelines, because rules carry greater weight in 
legitimacy and enforcement, in addition to providing more clarity and 
uniformity in facilitating arbitrations.  Additionally, Germany’s supposition 
that rules may exacerbate the “party-dominated process” in arbitral 
proceedings may be rebutted: the application of transparency standards will 
require the express consent of parties to a treaty to arbitrate under any 
version of the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules.
140
 
Rules have greater force in facilitating arbitrations than guidelines.  
Unless the disputing parties expressly agree otherwise, guidelines or 
interpretations are swallowed by the governing arbitration rules when there 
is a conflict.  For example, open hearings for NAFTA investment treaties 
are subject to the governing ICSID, ICSID Additional Facility, or 
 
2010). 
 134 Id. 
 135 Id. at 2. 
 136 Id. at 3. 
 137 Id. at 2. 
 138 Id. 
 139 U.N. Comm’n on Int’l Trade Law Secretariat, supra note 133, at 2. 
 140 See infra Part V.C (discussing the application of the new transparency standards). 
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UNCITRAL Rules even though the NAFTA States have consented to open 
hearings through their Open Hearings Statement.
141
  Arbitrating under the 
UNCITRAL Rules requires the consent of the claimant party for hearings to 
be made open,
142
 so a disputing party can veto the other party’s desire to 
hold an open hearing.  Thus, investment treaties to which NAFTA 
governments are a party are still bound by administering rules selected by 
the investor at the time of arbitration.
143
 
The form of the transparency instrument will affect the drafting style 
and application of the legal standards.  The Working Group II indicated a 
strong preference for drafting the legal standard in the form of clear rules 
rather than looser, more discursive guidelines.
144
  By drafting guidelines, 
the legal standard would be less forceful in style and practice.  Where 
guidelines consist of lengthier explanations to parties and present various 
options parties can choose from, their content will be less definitive in style 
and more disjointed in application than rules.  Without the clear and 
uniform approach that rules can deliver, disputing parties in investment 
arbitrations will be left with unpredictable and inconsistent transparency 
standards. 
The United Nations has recognized that UNCITRAL—through its 
work in international trade law and status as a U.N. body—has an essential 
role in advancing good governance and promoting the rule of law at the 
national and international levels in the interest of economic and social 
development.
145
  The Working Group II acknowledged this responsibility in 
expressing its preference for a transparency instrument in the form of rules: 
[H]igh standards on transparency in treaty-based investor-State 
arbitration should be established because transparency contribute[s] 
to promoting the rule of law, good governance, due process and 
rights to access information.  It [is] also seen as an important step to 
respond to the increasing challenges regarding the legitimacy of 
international investment law and arbitration as such . . . [thus] the 
legal standard on transparency should take the form of detailed rules 




 141 See Statement on Open Hearings in NAFTA Chapter Eleven Arbitrations, supra note 
55. 
 142 See Menaker, supra note 59, at 155. 
 143 See Teslik, supra note 52. 
 144 Report of the Working Group Fifty-Fourth Session, supra note 3, ¶ 25. 
 145 See, e.g., G.A. Res. 58/76, at 1, U.N. Doc. A/RES/58/76 (Jan. 8, 2004) (“[T]he United 
Nations Commission on International Trade Law will be of further assistance to States, in 
particular developing countries, in promoting good governance and establishing an 
appropriate legislative framework for such projects.”). 
 146 Report of the Working Group Fifty-Fourth Session, supra note 3, ¶ 25. 
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Crystallizing greater public disclosure in the form of rules furthers the 
United Nations objective of good governance and legitimizes the issue of 
transparency in investment arbitrations, whereas non-binding guidelines 
may diminish the force of transparency standards. 
Finally, detailed rules of procedure would better provide “the certainty 
contemplated by the objective of UNCITRAL to harmonize international 
trade law.”147  UNCITRAL has noted that one way of furthering the 
mandate to promote harmonization and unification of international trade 
law “is to routinely collect and publish decisions and awards interpreting 
and applying relevant legal texts.”148  Where current UNCITRAL 
provisions are mostly silent on the issue of transparency, public disclosure 
of awards and decisions are “random and incomplete.”149  Moreover, parties 
arbitrating under nebulous guidelines are without a clearly uniform 
approach to standards and are thus subject to case-by-case rulings by the 
authorizing tribunal.  Clear procedural rules on the disclosure of arbitration 
proceedings will reduce uncertainties regarding legal transparency 
standards.  A legal instrument in the form of rules, therefore, is consistent 
with UNCITRAL’s purpose of harmonizing the law of international trade. 
Transparency standards should be legitimized by taking shape as rules.  
Where the 1976 and 2010 UNCITRAL Rules were primarily designed to 
govern commercial arbitrations between private parties,
150
 an additional set 
of rules on transparency should be available to address the demand for 
transparency in investment disputes.  Rules would take into consideration 
distinct needs and interests of investor-State arbitrations and clear hurdles 
 
 147 Id. 
 148 NATHALIE BERNASCONI-OSTERWALDER, CTR. FOR INT’L ENVTL. LAW & INT’L INST. FOR 
SUSTAINABLE DEV., ENSURING TRANSPARENCY IN INVESTOR-STATE DISPUTE RESOLUTION 
UNDER THE UNCITRAL ARBITRATION RULES 3 (2011), available at 
http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2011/ensuring_transparency.pdf; see generally U.N. Comm’n on 
Int’l Trade Law, Case Law on UNCITRAL Texts (CLOUT): User Guide, U.N. Doc. 
A/CN.9/SER.C/GUIDE/I/Rev.2 (June 2, 2010). 
 149 BERNASCONI-OSTERWALDER, supra note 148. 
 150 The 1976 UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules were not specifically tailored to resolve 
investor-State disputes or entertain claims for breach of customary or conventional 
international law.  Article 1(1) of the 1976 UNCITRAL Rules, for example, refers only to 
“disputes in relation to [a] contract.”  Rep. of the U.N. Comm’n on Int’l Trade Law, 9th 
Sess., Apr. 12–May 7, 1976, U.N. Doc. A/31/17, ch. V, § C; GAOR, 31st Sess., Supp. No. 
17 (1976) [hereinafter 1976 UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules], 
http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/yearbooks/yb-1976-e/vol7-p9-82-e.pdf (last visited Mar. 
5, 2013); see also 1976 - UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, UNITED NATIONS COMMISSION ON 
INT’L TRADE L., 
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/arbitration/1976Arbitration_rules.html 
(last visited Mar. 4, 2013) (“[T]he UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules provide a comprehensive 
set of procedural rules upon which parties may agree for the conduct of arbitral proceedings 
arising out of their commercial relationship and are widely used in ad hoc arbitrations as 
well as administered arbitrations.”). 
 UNCITRAL’s Unclear Transparency Instrument 
33:439 (2013) 
467 




C.  The Application of Transparency Standards 
While the Working Group II enjoyed broad consensus in favor of 
adopting transparency standards, its delegates were at “loggerheads over 
whether it [was] permissible to read new [transparency] rules” into existing 
treaties.
152
  The issue churned a substantial amount of debate among 
Working Group II delegates, since the applicability of the new transparency 
rules would have “an important practical impact as there [are] more than 
2,500 investment treaties in force to date, but less than [ten] treaties had 
been concluded in 2010.”153 
Depending on the form of the new standards, UNCITRAL could apply 
the transparency standards to both existing and future treaties.  The issue of 
the standards’ applicability is a complicated one.  The Commission needs to 
account for a number of legal and policy considerations related to treaties 
existing prior to the Commission’s official issuance of the transparency 
standards (anticipated for July 2013).  Even though the UNCITRAL 
Commission has reached broad consensus on the “importance of ensuring 
transparency in treaty-based investor-State arbitration”154 and has stated that 
achieving greater transparency is “a desirable objective,”155 UNCITRAL 
should not overstep its boundaries in enforcing new legal standards without 
the consent of the parties. 
1.  Applicability of the Rules on Transparency to Existing Treaties 
The Working Group II explored a number of possible instruments that 
would facilitate an application of the new transparency standards to existing 
treaties.
156
  Among the buffet of potential solutions were automatic 
applications to all treaties, or applications only upon the express consent of 
the arbitrating parties.  The applicability of the new standards remains a 
 
 151 See 1976 UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, supra note 150. 
 152 Julie A. Maupin, Transparency in International Investment Law: The Good, the Bad, 
and the Murky, in TRANSPARENCY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (forthcoming 2013) (manuscript 
at 10 n.55), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2058195. 
 153 U.N. Comm’n on Int’l Trade Law Rep. of Working Group II (Arbitration and 
Conciliation) on the work of its 53d Sess., Oct. 4–8, 2010, ¶ 85, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/712 (Oct. 
20, 2010) [hereinafter Report of the Working Group Fifty-Third Session]. 
 154 Report of the Working Group Fifty-Fourth Session, supra note 3, ¶ 1. 
 155 Id.; Report of the Working Group Fifty-Eighth Session, supra note 105, ¶ 75. 
 156 Possible solutions discussed by the Working Group II are joint interpretative 
statements, unilateral declarations, amendments to treaties, automatic application of the new 
standards, and a convention of the States.  See generally U.N. Comm’n on Int’l Trade Law 
Secretariat, supra note 127. 
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contentious topic among the Working Group II delegates.  Accordingly, this 
Comment reviews the merits to both sides of the debate and concludes that 
the new transparency standards should automatically apply to future 
treaties, and apply to existing treaties only when parties give express 
consent. 
Some delegates proposed the “opt-in approach,” where the new 
transparency standards would apply to existing treaties only where express 
consent has been provided by the parties subject to the arbitration.
157
  
Others, such as Canada and the United States, rejected this option and 
instead advocated for an “out-out approach” that would automatically apply 
the new standards to existing treaties unless parties specifically referred to 
another version of the UNCITRAL Rules.
158
  Significantly, the 
deliberations expose underlying policy concerns, such as maximizing 
widespread adoption of transparency standards versus preserving parties’ 
intent in the arbitration process.  Both policy considerations are worthwhile 
goals that tug at different approaches to applying the standards.  However, 
an optimal balance to realizing both ends can be achieved by treating 
existing and future treaties differently through: (1) an opt-out approach to 
future treaties, and (2) an opt-in approach to existing treaties. 
An opt-out approach to existing treaties would embrace the new 
transparency standards as the default rule, which is objectionable in spite of 
its advantages.  The new standards, “like other provisions of the 
UNCITRAL arbitration rules, will be deemed to apply unless the State 
parties to the treaty specified otherwise.”159  Where an investment treaty 
expressly refers to a prior version of the governing UNCITRAL Rules,
160
 an 
automatic application of any newly amended rules would not be possible.  
However, where an investment treaty refers generally to the UNCITRAL 
Arbitration Rules without any further indication of a version, the treaty 
would be interpreted to have made a “dynamic reference” to the evolution 
of the Rules.
161
  In other words, a general reference to the UNCITRAL 
Rules implies the “treaty parties . . . consented to a dynamic reference to 
those rules and contemplated that the rules in force at the time the dispute 
was initiated would apply.”162  The applicability of the new standards to 
 
 157 See id. 
 158 See Maupin, supra note 152, at 10. 
 159 NATHALIE BERNASCONI-OSTERWALDER & LISE JOHNSON, CTR. FOR INT’L ENVTL. LAW 
& INT’L INST. FOR SUSTAINABLE DEV., COMMENTS ON DRAFT RULES ON TRANSPARENCY IN 
INVESTOR-STATE ARBITRATION 5 (2011), available at 
http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2011/uncitral_comments_draft_rules.pdf. 
 160 Parties to a dispute can expressly request arbitration under a specific version of the 
UNCITRAL Rules.  See, e.g., 1976 UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, supra note 150. 
 161 Report of the Working Group Fifty-Fourth Session, supra note 3, ¶ 37. 
 162 BERNASCONI-OSTERWALDER & JOHNSON, supra note 159, at 6. 
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existing treaties would be conditional on the intention of the parties: treaties 
explicitly referencing a version of the UNCITRAL Rules would be subject 
to those rules, even if they were not in force at the time of the dispute. 
The driving motivation behind an opt-out approach is to enable the 
new transparency standards—as default rules for existing treaties—to have 
a broader application to investment arbitrations, thus “furthering the 
mandate by the Commission to enhance transparency in treaty-based 
investor-State arbitration.”163  Otherwise, the limitations of an opt-in 
approach would have minimal impact on the 2,500 existing treaties, and 
transparency reforms may see little change to the status quo.  Moreover, the 
tremendous proliferation of bilateral and multilateral investment treaties in 
recent decades points to the potential for significant disparity on the impact 
of the new rules on transparency should the legal standards only apply to 
future treaties.
164
  The U.N. Secretary-General’s Special Representative on 
Business and Human Rights submitted a proposal to the Commission 
advocating for the widest application of transparency standards in 
investment arbitrations by highlighting the concern that treating existing 
treaties differently from future treaties would result in an undesirable “two-
tiered” set of arbitrating practices: 
[T]ransparency [is] an integral part of UNCITRAL’s Arbitration 
Rules as they apply to investor-State dispute resolution.  I also hope 
that appropriate rules for transparency will not be limited solely to 
disputes under future agreements or treaties, but will apply equally to 
those that arise from such existing arrangements that rely on 
UNCITRAL’s rules.  It is important that your work not result in 
setting two tiers of practices, two sets of differing standards, 




From a human-rights advocacy perspective, the desire for a broad, 
consistent application of transparency rules is clear, regardless of whether 
the treaty was signed before the new standards are introduced.  As desirable 
as the objective may be, this Comment argues that UNCITRAL—as a 
public intergovernmental body—is limited by its scope of authority in 
enforcing new legal standards and should remain faithful to basic 
arbitration principles of party consent. 
 
 163 Report of the Working Group Fifty-Third Session, supra note 153, ¶ 86. 
 164 See Tuck, supra note 16, at 885–86. 
 165 Rachel Davis, Special Representative of the U.N. Secretary-Gen. on the Issue of 
Human Rights & Transnat’l Corps. & Other Bus. Enters., Statement to the UNCITRAL 
Working Group II (Arbitration and Conciliation) (Feb. 7–11, 2011), available at 
http://www.business-humanrights.org/media/documents/ruggie-statement-uncitral-working-
group-ii.pdf. 
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While transparency standards may be desirable and their automatic 
application to existing treaties would certainly result in greater adoption, 
UNCITRAL does not have the authority to unilaterally impose new legal 
standards on States.  The introduction and application of a new legal 
standard to existing treaties “constitute[s] an amendment to the treaty 
provision on dispute settlement, which could not be done without the 
agreement of the treaty parties, who are ‘masters’ of their treaty.”166  
Arbitration is based on two parties’ consent, while an investment treaty 
between States is governed by international law pursuant to the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties, which prohibits any amendments to a 
treaty without the consent of the parties to the treaty.
167
  The Vienna 
Convention provides as a general rule of treaty interpretation that a “treaty 
shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning 
to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its 
object and purpose.”168 
An approach that takes into consideration conscious decision-making 
by the parties “complie[s] with public international law and practice.”169  A 
dynamic interpretation of the treaties is thus impermissible by the standards 
of international law, and UNCITRAL—as an intergovernmental body—
would overstep its authority if it retroactively applied the new standards to 
existing treaties.  Therefore, an opt-in approach, which preserves parties’ 
intent, should prevail with existing treaties.  Otherwise, UNCITRAL could 
face legal challenges for violating the terms of existing treaties and for 
improperly applying international law. 
Moreover, the opt-in approach remains consistent with the approach 
adopted by the 2010 UNCITRAL Rules. The approach is reflected in 
Article 1.2 of the Rules: 
The parties to an arbitration agreement concluded after 15 August 
2010 shall be presumed to have referred to the Rules in effect on the 
date of commencement of the arbitration, unless the parties have 
agreed to apply a particular version of the Rules.  That presumption 
does not apply where the arbitration agreement has been concluded 
 
 166 U.N. Comm’n on Int’l Trade Law Secretariat, supra note 127, ¶ 28. 
 167 Christoph Schreuer, United Nations Conference on Trade & Dev., Course on Dispute 
Settlement—Module 2.3: Consent to Arbitration, at 1, UN Doc. 
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by accepting after 15 August 2010 an offer made before that date.
170
 
The 2010 UNCITRAL Rules do not presumptively apply to 
agreements made prior to the date of their enactment.  This approach was 
justified partially by the fact that the 1976 UNCITRAL Rules did not 
contain any presumption that they would be subject to amendments.
171
  
Likewise, the 2010 UNCITRAL Rules do not contain any presumption that 
agreements are subject to amendments.  The issues of applicability—from 
the 1976 to the 2010 UNCITRAL Rules, and from the generic rules to the 
new transparency standards—are similar, and should thus be treated 
similarly.  Any new transparency standard should be consistent with the 
approach adopted by the 2010 UNCITRAL Rules.  Taking a different 
approach would otherwise create confusion and legal uncertainty in the 
international arbitration community. 
Parties may opt-in to the transparency standards by issuing a joint 
interpretative declaration.  The Vienna Convention provides that “any 
subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the interpretation of 
the treaty or the application of the provisions” shall be taken into account, 
together with the context, as having the effect of an authentic 
interpretation.
172
  A joint interpretative statement by parties to an 
investment treaty could express the agreement between the States “that the 
provision of the treaty providing for investor-State arbitration should be 
interpreted as including [or excluding] the application of the legal standard 
on transparency.”173 
A joint interpretative declaration, according to the Vienna Convention, 
does not require any special form, “but would clearly have to demonstrate 
the intention of the parties that their declaration constitutes an agreed basis 
for interpretation.”174  Parties to a treaty should have the opportunity to 
issue an interpretation of which rules govern their existing treaties.  Joint 
interpretative declarations “may be viewed as coming close to a 
modification or amendment of the original treaty.”175  Even if subsequent 
declarations deviate from the original intention of the agreement, 
international courts and tribunals have accepted these declarations as 
authentic interpretations of the treaty.
176
  A joint interpretative declaration 
should thus be a tool to opt-in to a desired version of the UNCITRAL 
Arbitration Rules, as it preserves the fundamental principle that 
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international arbitration is based on the consent between parties. 
2.  Applicability of the Rules on Transparency to Future Treaties 
While deference is given to parties’ consent in existing treaties, the 
focus should shift to ensuring the widest application of transparency 
standards to future treaties.  This is because an opt-in approach to existing 
treaties and an opt-out approach to future treaties strike an optimal balance 
of policy goals: greater transparency in investor-State arbitrations where 
arbitration is based on the consent of parties. 
Under an opt-out solution, there would be a presumption that the 
transparency standards would apply to future treaties referring to the 
UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, unless a reference to a different version of 
the Rules was made in the treaty.
177
  A reference to the UNCITRAL 
Arbitration Rules in future treaties would therefore include a presumed 
reference to the transparency standards.  Accordingly, transparency 
standards would apply unless States otherwise expressly opt-out of the legal 
standards—the approach proposed by the Working Group II.178  This 
presumption could be clarified with an amendment to the 2010 UNCITRAL 
Rules, where Article 1 could state that an arbitration agreement concluded 
after the effective date of the new transparency standards shall be presumed 
to have referred to the version of the UNCITRAL Rules in effect on the 
date of commencement of the arbitration, unless the parties agreed to apply 
a particular version of the Rules.
179
 
Including the new transparency standards in the default version of the 
UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules for future treaties accomplishes two main 
policy objectives.  First, it situates a “wider application of the legal standard 
on transparency, and thereby ensure that the mandate given by the 
Commission to the Working Group to promote transparency to [investor-
State arbitrations] would be better fulfilled.”180  Second, it avoids 
undermining the force and applicability of the Working Group II’s new 
transparency standards.  Unlike the case with existing treaties, a different 
approach from the opt-in solution is recommended for future treaties 
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because UNCITRAL does not have to violate public international law by 
retroactively applying new legal standards to treaties completed prior to the 
effective date of the transparency standards.  Under the opt-out option, 
treaty parties still retain the power not to submit to the new standards.  The 
opt-out solution provides the greatest flexibility in scope of the standards’ 
application to future treaties, while respecting the treaty parties’ intent in 
both existing and future investment treaties. 
Furthermore, an amendment to the 2010 UNCITRAL Rules that 
clarifies the presumption of the applicability of transparency standards 
provides future parties notice of the default legal standards.  Parties to 
investor-State arbitration can consciously elect the UNCITRAL Rules 
effective at the commencement of the arbitration, knowing that the 
presumption in favor of the transparency standards exists, and explicitly 
reference a different version of the UNCITRAL Rules in the treaty if they 
prefer it to govern certain disputes or aspects of the dispute.  In order to 
promote a greater adoption of the new standards in investor-State 
arbitrations, the burden should be placed on the arbitrating parties to opt-out 
of the new status quo favoring transparency. 
Adopting an opt-out approach remains consistent with the approach 
followed by the Working Group II for the 2010 UNCITRAL Rules.
181
  For 
investment treaties concluded after the effective date of the 2010 
UNCITRAL Rules, there is a presumption that a reference to the 
UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules refers to the 2010 version of the Rules, 
unless the parties to the treaty agree otherwise.
182
  Likewise, the same 
presumption regarding transparency standards should be practiced in order 
to limit confusion and uncertainty about the applicability of future 
amendments and newly developed standards to the UNCITRAL Rules. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
While there has been broad consensus in the international arbitration 
community in favor of increased transparency in investment arbitrations, 
UNCITRAL faces complexities in designing the structure of the new 
standards.  Determining the form and application of new transparency 
standards, designed for incorporation into the UNCITRAL Arbitration 
Rules (just recently revised for the first time in three decades), is more than 
a technical exercise.  UNCITRAL must factor in weighty policy 
considerations and balance the law of treaties respecting party consent with 
the objective of achieving greater transparency in investment arbitrations.  
Any new transparency standard in investor-State arbitration must be drafted 
in a way that will have wide traction and acceptance by State-parties to 
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disputes, both with regards to existing and future treaties.  At the same time, 
UNCITRAL must be guided by the basic arbitration principle of party 
consent: the new standards endorsing greater transparency should remain 
within the boundaries set by the international law of treaties. 
When considering the form in which the transparency standards should 
be drafted, UNCITRAL should fashion binding rules as opposed to 
nonbinding guidelines.  This choice will have significant implications on 
the instrument’s drafting style and force of application on disputing parties.  
A legal instrument taking the form of an annex to the existing UNCITRAL 
Rules will help establish the legitimacy of transparency among the 
international community, create a uniform application, and promote greater 
adoption of the transparency standards while mostly leaving unaltered the 
original purpose of UNCITRAL Rules governing commercial arbitrations. 
Moreover, given that the UNCITRAL Commission has reached broad 
consensus on the “importance of ensuring transparency in treaty-based 
investor-State arbitration,”183 and has stated that achieving greater 
transparency is “a desirable objective,”184 the Commission should adopt a 
provision that promotes the broadest application of legal transparency 
standards.  Among the menu of potential solutions, the Commission should 
adopt a provision that requires the express consent of parties to an existing 
treaty in order for the new transparency standards to apply.  For future 
treaties, the new transparency standards should be the default set of 
applicable UNCITRAL Rules, unless the treaty parties expressly opt-out by 
referencing a prior version of the Rules. 
Foisting new rules onto investment arbitrations have more open-ended 
implications on governments than private commercial parties.  Whereas 
commercial parties select their counterparties when entering into an 
arbitration agreement, sovereigns become a party to investment arbitrations 
without directly agreeing with the other side.  The introduction of new 
standards governing investor-State arbitrations thus leaves sovereign parties 
with greater uncertainty about the impact the new rules will have on present 
and future treaties.  Therefore, UNCITRAL should pay tribute to the 
principle of party consent by not imposing new transparency standards as 
the default applicable rules to existing treaties without the express 
permission of the parties. 
This Comment recommends these measures of form and application of 
transparency standards in hopes that they only augment the force of 
effectiveness and legitimacy of the original UNCITRAL Arbitration 
Rules—which today remains one of the most widely recognized set of rules 
in the context of international arbitration. 
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